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Notes
CONFLICT OF LAWS-JURISDICTION FOR DlvORE--Plaintiff, a
soldier, while stationed in a certain parish, married defendant, a
resident of that parish. After living with her a few days the
plaintiff left the defendant and filed suit for divorce. On seeking
to confirm the judgment by default, the trial judge dismissed the
suit on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction because the
wife's "domicile was that of her husband and there was no show-
ing that he had abandoned his original domicile."' On appeal this
judgment was set aside, the court finding that the plaintiff had
established a "matrimonial domicile" from the fact that he had
stated the "room or apartment was occupied by them with the
intention of making it their matrimonial domicile." Burgan v.
Burgan, 22 So. (2d) 649 (La. 1945).
In the case of Zinko v. Zinko2 a similar situation was involved
wherein the wife was suing her soldier husband and the suit was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The supreme court held that
the district court had jurisdiction provided the cause of action
arose in this state and the defendant had his principal domestic
establishment in the parish or if the plaintiff had acquired a sepa-
rate domicile.8
Until the first case of Williams v. North Carolina4 a court in
order to have jurisdiction for a divorce had to have jurisdiction
over the domicile of both parties,5 or the domicile of one party
and have the other personally subjected to the jurisdiction of the
court,6 or have jurisdiction over the place of last matrimonial
domicile and the domicile of one of the parties.' The Williams
1. At time of induction plaintiff was domiciled in Virginia and it was
clear that when he came to Louisiana he had no intention of establishing
domicile here. See Art. 39, La Civil Code of 1870; Stevens v. Allen, 139 La.
658, 71 So. 936 (1916); Peoples v. Land, 181 La. 925, 160 So. 631 (1935); Re-
statement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, § 111.
2. 204 La. 478, 15 So.(2d) 859 (1943).
3. On the question of wife establishing a separate domicile, see Champon
v. Champon, 40 La. Ann. 28, 3 So. 397 (1888); Succession of Lasseigne, 143
La. 1095, 79 So. 873 (1918).
4. 317 U.S. 287, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279 (1942), noted in (1945) 5 Louisi-
ana Law Review 319.
5. Harding v. Harding, 198 U.S. 317, 25 S.Ct. 679, 49 LEd. 1066 (1905);
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 26 S.Ct. 525, 50 L.Ed. 867, 5 Ann. Cas. 1
(1906).
6. Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U.S. 108, 19 L.Ed. 604 (1869).
7. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 21 S.Ct. 544, 45 LEd. 794 (1901).
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case" held that it was sufficient if the court had jurisdiction over
the domicile of the plaintiff, thus doing away with the trouble-
some question of matrimonial domicile.9 It should be noted that
the court did not decide the question of whether a state has the
power to refuse full faith and credit to Nevada decrees because
they are based on residence rather than domicile. The state of
North Carolina relied partially on Haddock v. Haddock,1° which
the court overruled; and since the verdict was a general one, the
court had to reverse the conviction. 1
The only question that should have been involved in the
above case was whether the plaintiff was in fact domiciled in
the parish. The rules of domicile are well established. The domi-
cile of the wife is that of her husband. 12 The domicile of origin
continues until another is acquired," and in order to change
domicile there must be residence with the intention to remain
permanently or indefinitely. 4 The presumption is that there has
been no change, with the burden of proof on the party seeking
to show the change.15
Though the rules are well established as to the change of
domicile, it is not always an easy matter to determine if in fact
8. Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87
L.Ed. 279 (1942).
9. The court in the second Williams case said that their decision stood
for the fact that "domicile of one spouse within a state gives power to that
state to dissolve a marriage wherever contracted. The jurisdictional require-
ments of domicile is freed from the confusing requirements about matri-
monial domicile." 5 C.C.H. S.Ct. Bull. (1945) 1497.
10. 201 U.S. 562, 26 S.Ct. 525, 50 L.Ed. 867, 5 Ann. Cas. 1 (1906).
11. Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298, 63 S.Ct. 207,
213, 87 L.Ed. 279, 285 (1942), where the court said: "It seems clear that the
provision of the Nevada statute that a plaintiff . . . reside in the state for
the required period requires him to have a domicile ... in the state."
317 U.S. 287, 298n, 63 S.Ct. 207, 213n, 87 L.Ed. 279, 285n: "As stated In
Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 624, the 'essential fact that raises a
change of abode to a change of domicile is the absence of intention to live
elsewhere."
This is merely paying lip service to the rules regarding change of
domicile.
12. Arts. 39, 120, La. Civil Code of 1870; Latche v. His Wife, 156 La. 165,
100 So. 292 (1924); Barrow v. Barrow, 160 La. 91, 106 So. 705 (1926).
13. Succession of Simmons, 109 La. 1095,.34 So. 101 (1903); First National
Bank v. Hinton, 123 La. 1018, 49 So. 692 (1909); Stevens v. Allen, 139 La.
658, 71 So. 936 (1916); Texana Oil & Refining Co. v. Belchic, 150 La. 88,
90 So. 522 (1922); Rappenport v. Patten, 3 So.(2d) 909 (La. App. 1941).
14. Succession of Simmons, 109 La. 1095, 34 So. 101 (1903); Macks v.
Gumania Savings Bank, 110 La. 659, 34 So. 725 (1903); Texana Oil & Refining
Co. v. Belchic, 150 La. 88, 90 So. 522 (1922); LeBlanc v. Loughridge, 153 La. 109,
95 So. 419 (1923); Succession of Webre, 172 La. 1104, 136 So. 67 (1931).
15. Succession of Franklin, 7 La. Ann. 395 (1852); Succession of Simmons,
109 La. 1095, 34 So. 101 (1903); Kinder v. Scharft, 125 La. 594, 51 So. 654
(1910); Person v. Person, 172 La. 740, 135 So. 225 (1931); Rappenport v. Pat-
ten, 3 So.(2d) 909 (La. App. 1941).
NOTES
a change has been made. In each of the above cases it was clear
that no change had been made until the time of marriage, and
in each case the trial judge found the absence of proper intention
to establish a domicile in Louisiana. In the Burgan case the court
seemed to find that the mere allegation that the parties intended
to make Alexandria their "matrimonial domicile" was sufficient
manifestation of intent. It is not clear whether the court meant
that the plaintiff had changed his domicile, or whether the parties
had a "matrimonial domicile" in the parish which was sufficient
to give the court jurisdiction. Nor is the rule of the Zinko case
that the court had jurisdiction if the cause of action arose in the
state and the defendant had his principal domestic establishment
in the parish any too clear. Since the parties had lived together
nowhere else, that was the only place of domestic residence; but
it does not necessarily follow that either party was domiciled
there. In each case the court seemed to base jurisdiction on the
idea of "matrimonial domicile."' 6
Because of the many marriages contracted by soldiers in this
state this question is of great importance. In most of those cases
the soldiers never intended to make Louisiana their home, but
doubtless many of them will seek divorces in this state. In the
second case of Williams v. State of North Carolina., the court held
that the state of domiciliary origin could inquire into the question
of domicile and is not bound by the finding as to jurisdiction,"
so the courts of this state should be cautious in finding jurisdic-
tion for divorce. These decisions seem more within the rules of
domicile than those Nevada divorces based on a statute that re-
quires six weeks residence. It is submitted, however, that in
order to find a change of domicile there should be clear, positive
proof of intent to remain in this state permanently or indefinitely.
The declaration of intention or the fact that the principal domes-
tic establishment is in the state, unsupported by further evidence,
is not enough.
HOWARD W. WRIGHT
16. In the Zinko case Judge O'Niell stated that he was of the opinion
that "where there is no community property, [the suit for divorce] is strictly
a personal action and may be brought therefore at the place where the
defendant is residing at the time when the suit is brought, and especially
if that is the place where the offense is committed and hence that the judge
should not dismiss the suit . . . if the defendant . . . answers the suit and
thereby submits to the jurisdiction of the court." Zinko v. Zinko, 204 La.
478, 485, 15 So.(2d) 859, 861 (1943).
17. Does this mean that in a criminal action only the state of domicil-
iary origin can inquire into the question of jurisdiction? Also, is the right
to inquire into the jurisdiction limited to criminal cases, precluding question-
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